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This thesis analyzes the level of effectiveness of the development assistance that Haiti 
has received since being struck by an earthquake on January 12, 2010. Despite receiving 
billions of dollars in development assistance, Haiti has little tangible results to show for 
all of the money spent. According to a 2014 report from the United Nations Special 
Envoy to Haiti, $6.43 billion of this aid has already been disbursed.    
 This thesis analyzes the political and socioeconomic history of Haiti focusing on 
the progress and changes over the past five years since receiving the additional economic 
assistance and documenting the challenges facing Haiti moving forward.  This thesis 
finds that Haiti the political and socioeconomic climate is extremely intricate and 
complex and progress is difficult to measure.  It concludes that over half of the allocated 
funds have been allocated to consumable resources that do not provide any enduring 
benefit to the nation, but that many of the resources were spent on opportunistic NGOs 
without the knowledge or consent of the Haitian government.  Despite historical 
precedence, the Haitian government needs more autonomy in determining its future if it 
is going to achieve enduring prosperity. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the level of effectiveness of the development 
assistance that Haiti has received since 2010. At the beginning of the 19th century, Haiti 
was the most profitable colony in the Western Hemisphere.1 Since gaining independence 
in 1804, however, Haiti has been wracked with poverty.2 Despite receiving billions of 
dollars in development assistance, including over $4 billion from the United States 
between 1998 and 2008, Haiti has little to show for it.3  The most recent setback in Haiti 
was an earthquake on January 12, 2010 that brought international attention to the dire 
situation in Haiti and resulted in $13.34 billion committed to the Haitian relief effort.4  
As of 2012, $6.43 billion of this aid was disbursed.5  Now, nearly five years after the 
earthquake, this thesis will seek to determine if Haiti has made any economic progress 
and if Haiti is finally on the path to prosperity, or if it is destined to remain a failed state. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Despite being just the 147th largest country and the 84th most populated, there are 
several factors that make this island nation historically and regionally relevant.  Haiti is 
just 600 miles off the coast of Florida, sharing the island of Hispaniola with the 
Dominican Republic.6 For centuries, Haiti has been one of the poorest and worst 
                                                 
1 Robert D. Heinl and Nancy G. Heinl, Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian people, 1492–1971, 
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), 30–31. 
2 Maureen Taft-Morales, Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional 
Concerns, (Washington, DC: CRS, 2014), i. 
3 Terry F. Buss and Adam Gardner, Haiti in the Balance: Why Foreign Aid Has Failed and What We 
Can Do About It (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 1. 
4 “International Assistance: General Information on the Status of Aid to Haiti,” Office of the 
Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Community-Based Medicine & Lessons Learned from Haiti, 
United Nations, accessed May 28, 2014, 
http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org/download/International_Assistance/1-overall-key-facts.pdf. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Buss and Gardner, Haiti in the Balance, 1. 
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governed countries in the world.7  Haiti’s current condition has the potential to adversely 
affect the surrounding area, especially when taking into account the number of refugees 
that flee to the United States in times of crisis. Haiti exists in a perpetual state of violence 
and instability, and recently it has taken an increased role in illegal drug trafficking from 
South America.8 
The United States has intervened in Haiti numerous times. The United States sent 
an occupation force from 1915–1934,9 sent armed forces to restore democracy in 1994,10 
and intervened in halting a coup d’état in 2004.11Another United States military 
intervention may occur if the situation in Haiti devolves to the point where there is 
another coup d’état. 
There would be several benefits to the region in general and particularly the 
United States in Haiti becoming an economic success. Haiti has the potential to be a 
larger trading partner with the United States; there is a strong Haitian-American diaspora, 
and fostering a positive relationship with Haiti can increase ties to the rest of the Latin 
American and Caribbean community. It is in the best interest of the United States to 
ensure the developmental assistance provided to Haiti is being used responsibly.   
Even before the earthquake in Haiti, the question of development assistance was 
an issue. The National Academy of Public Administration addressed this issue in 2004 at 
a meeting of the Reconstruction Partnership/Fragile Nations Project.12  With 38 public 
sector bilateral and multilateral donor groups pledging over $10.3 billion to relief and 
recovery efforts, Haiti needs to be held accountable to act responsibly for the betterment 
                                                 
7 Taft-Morales, Haiti Under President Martelly, i. 
8 Ibid., 36. 
9 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1971), 24. 
10 John R. Ballard, Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994–1997 
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998), 49. 
11 Paul Farmer, “Who Removed Aristide?,” London Review of Books 26, no. 8 (2004): 30. 
12 “2010–2012 Overall Contributions from Public Sector Donors to Relief and Recovery Efforts in 
Haiti as of December 2012, in USD Millions (Excluding Debt Relief),” Office of the Special Envoy for 
Haiti, United Nations, accessed June 4, 2014, 
http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org/download/International_Assistance/2-overall-financing-data.pdf. 
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of the nation, something it has repeatedly failed to do.13  Nearly five years after the 2010 
earthquake, it is worthwhile to ask whether those investments, coupled with changes in 
governmental structure and national policies, have resulted in any significant progress 
and determine what remains to be done. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Due to several significant events that highlight Haiti’s storied past, there is 
abundant literature available on Haiti. This literature is divided into three main 
categories: political history, economic history, and international aid.   
The first category of literature centers on Haiti’s political and governmental 
development. Several sources document the leadership challenges that Haiti faced 
between achieving freedom and modern day. One of the better sources documenting 
Haiti’s governmental development is chapter 2 and 3 of “Political Parties and Democracy 
in Haiti.”14  It provides a solid explanation of how Haitian politics has evolved from 
Haiti’s independence through 2001. Even though it does not cover Haiti’s current 
political environment, this thesis provides the context that shapes modern Haitian 
politics. 
Another good source capturing Haiti’s governmental history is Haiti’s Predatory 
Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy. Chapters 3 and 4 of this book present 
another account of the roots of the contemporary political challenges Haiti faces.15  
Despite providing an excellent analysis between the end of the Duvalier dictatorship in 
1986 to Aristide’s second inauguration in 2001, there is a gap covering the politics from 
2001 to the present day. 
Tectonic Shifts: Haiti since the Earthquake provides an account of the most recent 
political developments in Haiti. Despite covering the brief period between 2010 and early 
                                                 
13 “2010–2012 Overall Contributions from Public Sector Donors to Relief and Recovery Efforts in 
Haiti as of December 2012, in USD Millions (Excluding Debt Relief).”  
14 Matthew J. Jerbi, “Political Parties and Democracy in Haiti,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2001), 31–88. 
15 Robert Fatton, Haiti’s Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 51–106. 
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2012, this book helps to explain the contemporary politics in Haiti from the end of 
President Préval’s term to the beginning of Martelly’s Presidency.16   
A Congressional Research Service report of February 2014, titled “Haiti under 
President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns,” discusses President 
Martelly’s leadership and actions in Haiti.17  It discusses strategies for Haiti’s 
reconstruction and international assistance.18  It also lays out the policy objectives and 
assistance plan the United States has for Haiti.19   
As much attention as Haiti’s government has received, its economic challenges 
have received even more attention. A great resource documenting the economic history 
of Haiti is Haiti: The Politics of Squalor. Covering from 1750 through the 1960s, this 
book illustrates how the current economic challenges are nothing new to Haiti.20  It 
describes how economic opportunities have been wasted in the past and sees the current 
economic challenges facing Haiti as no surprise. 
The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations published two reports 
on economic assistance and economic affairs in Haiti in 2011. The first report focuses on 
promoting sustainable private sector growth and economic development in Haiti.21  The 
second report focused on rebuilding Haiti in the Martelly era.22  As President Martelly’s 
                                                 
16 Mark Schuller, and Pablo Morales, Tectonic Shifts: Haiti Since the Earthquake, (Sterling, VA: 
Kumarian Press, 2012). 
17 Maureen Taft-Morales, Haiti Under President Martelly, 6–10. 
18 Ibid., 15–19. 
19 Ibid., 21–38.  
20 Robert I. Rotberg and Christopher K. Clague, Haiti; the Politics of Squalor (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1971). 
21 United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. A Bill to Promote Sustainable 
Private Sector Growth and Economic Development in Haiti: Report (to Accompany S. 954) (Washington, 
DC: U.S. G.P.O., 2011), 2–5. 
22 United States, Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Western 
Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Economic Affairs United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign 
Relations. Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance. Rebuilding Haiti in the 
Martelly Era: A Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee On Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and 
Global Narcotics Affairs and the Subcommittee On International Development and Foreign Assistance, 
Economic Affairs, and International Environmental Protection of the Committee On Foreign Relations, 
United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, June 23, 2011 (Washington: U.S. 
G.P.O., 2011), 17–26. 
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first term comes to a close, facing an election later this year, the plans laid out in these 
reports failed to achieve the desired results. Tying in these plans to Haiti’s development 
aid distribution will provide an explanation for why the desired results were not achieved. 
There have also been some recent positive articles regarding Haiti’s economic 
prospects.  “Haiti: Hope for a Fragile State,” focuses on the society itself, the sources of 
difference, the origins of violence, and the possibility of change.23  Although it was 
published prior to the 2010 earthquake, its findings are still relevant in explaining Haiti’s 
economic development.   
“Finally, Good News from Haiti,” is another encouraging article. It shows the 
success of some community-based NGOs and the positive impacts they have made in the 
private sector.24  If ventures like these can continue, there is hope for reduction in 
developmental aid requirements for Haiti, as well as increased political stability. 
Deborah Gibbons wrote an article on the cultural and social aspects of recovery 
and growth in Haiti. Her article shows how some opportunistic Haitians are using 
possession of information or resources to ransom the members of their communities.25  
Her article emphasizes that Haitian society is divided into the socially elite minority and 
the poor majority. She indicates that by manipulating the delivery of developmental aid, 
the social elite NGOs are currently getting richer at the expense of the poor, local 
masses.26   
Much of the recent literature on Haiti focuses on poverty and international relief 
efforts, especially in response to the earthquake that hit Haiti in January 2010. Anna 
Versluis explored the formal and informal aid received following the 2010 earthquake by 
interviewing camp dwellers outside Port-au-Prince, Haiti’s capital and most populous 
                                                 
23 Yasmine Shamsie and Andrew S. Thompson, Haiti: Hope for a Fragile State, (Waterloo, Ontario: 
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2006). 
24 Robert Looney, “Finally, Good News From Haiti,” Foreign Policy (blog), May 3, 2013, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/03/finally_good_news_from_haiti. 
25 Deborah E. Gibbons, “Haiti: Cultural and Social Aspects of Recovery and Growth,” Feet on the 
Ground: Humanitarian Work Across Cultures (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 5. 
26 Ibid., 13. 
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city. Her article documents the inefficient and untimely distribution of aid, as well as the 
differences between formal and informal aid.27   
Two recent theses compared emergency response operations in Haiti to other 
countries in similar distress. Allende and Ayana demonstrate the importance of 
collaboration in humanitarian logistics when receiving aid, specifically comparing the 
responses in Haiti and Chile when each suffered an earthquake in 2010. Allende and 
Ayana found that neither system was very efficient at receiving and distributing aid, 
recommending greater planning, coordination, and collaboration with disaster response 
teams to increase the effectiveness of aid delivery.28  Javed Niazi compared the 
earthquake in Haiti to a flood in Pakistan in 2010. Niazi noted a much stronger 
international response to Haiti than Pakistan for a variety of reasons. Among these 
reasons was proximity to the United States, a perception that Pakistan could do more to 
help itself, the relative stability of Haiti compared to Pakistan, and potential ties between 
Pakistan and the Taliban in Afghanistan.29 
 “Cacophonies of Aid, Failed State Building and NGOs in Haiti,” is another 
excellent resource that presents the positive and negative sides of NGO involvement 
following a natural disaster. This article documents the damage the earthquake did by 
exposing the fragile nature of the administrative capacity of Haiti’s government.30  While 
some NGOs stepped in as substitutes for the state and weakened Haiti’s institutions, this 
article highlights a couple of community-based NGOs that contributed durable services to 
their local communities.31   
                                                 
27 Anna Versluis, “Formal and Informal Material Aid Following the 2010 Haiti Earthquake as 
Reported by Camp Dwellers,” Disasters 38, no. s1 (2014): S94. 
28 Victor Allende and Jorge Anaya, “Collaboration in Humanitarian Logistics: Comparative Analysis 
of Disaster Response in Chile and Haiti 2010,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 51–53. 
29 Javed I.Niazi, “Comparative Analysis of Emergency Response Operations Haiti Earthquake in 
January 2010 and Pakistan’s Flood in 2010,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 119–123. 
30 Laura Zanotti, “Cacophonies of Aid, Failed State Building and NGOs in Haiti: Setting the Stage for 
Disaster, Envisioning the Future,” Third World Quarterly 31, no. 5 (2010), 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2010.503567, 756. 
31 Ibid., 768. 
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Some of the literature addresses multiple categories. Terry Buss and Adam 
Gardner provide a wealth of information on the history and economic development in 
Haiti from independence through the election of President Rene Préval in 2006. Their 
book documents the historical instability of the Haitian government by showing that out 
of Haiti’s 54 elected presidents only eight served their full term in office and three of 
those were during the United States occupation between 1915 and 1934.32  Buss and 
Gardner also discuss the reasons foreign aid has failed and make some recommendations 
for future aid.33  This book was published in 2006, and those recommendations were not 
followed. 
Killing with Kindness: Haiti, International Aid, and NGOs, does an excellent job 
describing the International Aid received by the governmental in Haiti, and how this aid 
often fails to get where it needs to go, especially with undue pressure from NGOs. This 
book focuses on two NGOs providing aid, one private and one public, showing the 
different abilities and challenges afforded by the donors of the aid.34 
Despite all of the literature on Haiti, there has really been little emphasis on the 
lack of recent progress in Haiti. With the exception of a few community-based NGOs, 
there have been few success stories, even with additional economic assistance from 
disaster relief. The question remains: why are so many Haitians living in poverty despite 
the billions of dollars of developmental aid Haiti has received? 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
It seems clear that the developmental aid received by the Haitian government is 
not resulting in discernable benefit to the Haitians. I will review hypotheses that are put 
forward to explain this failure. These hypotheses center on governmental corruption, 
profiteering by the companies sent in to aid in Haiti’s recovery, and inappropriate use of 
aid by the Haitian recipients.   
                                                 
32 Buss and Gardner, Haiti in the Balance, 187–188. 
33 Ibid., 88–105. 
34 Mark Schuller, Killing With Kindness: Haiti, International Aid, and NGOs, (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 2012). 
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The first hypothesis is that governmental corruption is responsible for the lack of 
progress. Haiti has a long history of inefficient use of international aid; this appears to be 
just another example. A recent Congressional Research Service report lays out the 
challenges facing the Haitian governmental system very well. The report states the 
Haitian government under current President Martelly has made fighting government 
corruption the number one priority and has made some progress; however, “corruption 
remains rife at all levels,” according to U.N. Human Rights expert Michel Frost, just 
prior to his resignation in March 2013.35  The report notes the relative inexperience of 
President Martelly and his cabinet, as well as the legislative and judicial branches, stating 
specifically that “this is the first time in 25 years that Haiti has had those three branches 
of government in place.”36  With a high number of inexperienced leaders placed in 
positions of power and obtaining access to resources, governmental corruption is difficult 
to rule out, especially given Haiti’s past governmental regimes. Although this is a 
compelling proposition, there are alternative explanations. 
Another hypothesis was proposed by Laura Zanotti’s “Cacophonies of Aid, Failed 
State Building, and NGOs in Haiti: Setting the Stage for Disaster, Envisioning the 
Future.”  She proposes that privileged NGOs manipulated the Haitian government, 
playing on their naivety, in order to siphon off human and capital resources from the 
state, jeopardizing the building of sustainable national infrastructure.37  Zanotti does 
acknowledge how some honest NGOs were able to make positive impacts in Haiti, but 
the actions of some of the major international NGOs negatively affected the local 
economy, as well as the ability of the government to provide durable and consistent 
services to the population.38 
The third and final hypothesis to be explored is the idea that once the aid got to 
the Haitian people it was squandered and misused. A recent article published by Robert 
                                                 
35 Taft-Morales, Haiti under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns, 8–
9.  
36 Ibid., 8. 
37 Laura Zanotti, “Cacophonies of Aid, Failed State Building and NGOs in Haiti,” Third World, 768. 
38 Ibid. 
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Looney highlights the recent success of web-based companies that are committed to 
helping the poor and eliminating poverty. The two companies highlighted are Zafen, 
which provides interest-free loans to entrepreneurs, and Fonkoze, Haiti’s largest 
microfinance institution that delivers the loans from Zafen.39  The findings by Looney 
serve to reinforce the idea that the Haitians are proud and independent, preferring to work 
for a better life than wait for their government to take care of them. These promising 
indicators in the private sector may form the foundation for future economic growth and 
expansion in Haiti, increasing the stability of the country. 
Yet, Gibbons, through her observations of Haitian culture, documents how 
“control over a scarce resource can produce power if those who need the resource believe 
that it is critical and without substitutes.”40  She uses the example of a government 
depository librarian that would store blueprints of different floors of the same building in 
separate places that only she knew where to find them to make her indispensable.41  This 
article indicates that instead of being willing to work together for a common good, some 
Haitians are only working to serve their own self-interests, even in the aftermath of a 
natural disaster. 
Responsible utilization of resources is a challenge in a country like Haiti. From 
governmental oversight to the NGOs delivering the aid to the recipients, ensuring fair and 
equitable distribution tests the moral integrity of those involved that could profit from 
taking advantage of their position. When growth stagnates, each level is subject to 
examination to determine which step is the most likely place that something went wrong. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will examine the use of developmental aid in Haiti focusing on the 
past five years. Haiti will be treated as a single case study due to its unique political and 
economic development. The political history of Haiti will have to be explored to explain 
the foundation of current Haitian politics. Similarly, the economic decline and stagnation 
                                                 
39 Robert E. Looney, “Finally, Good News From Haiti,” 1. 
40 Gibbons, “Haiti: Cultural and Social Aspects,” 6. 
41 Ibid. 
 10 
of Haiti will also need to be uncovered in order to understand the current economic 
situation.   
Once the historical framework is established, I will focus on Haiti’s recent 
history. President Martelly was given additional aid in the wake of the 2010 earthquake 
to ease the poverty, bring relief to the victims, and grow Haiti’s infrastructure. I will look 
at why that has seemingly failed to take place or at least why the progress has been 
slower than expected. 
Finally, this study will show how a volatile Haiti presents a security challenge for 
the United States. Haiti is a nation that has required United States intervention to return to 
stability in the past. Further corruption and misuse of aid can potentially result in another 
intervention. With its proximity to the United States, the relative success of its neighbors, 
and an ability to produce exportable goods, Haiti seems to have the potential to return to 
prosperity; because it has failed to do so indicates underlying causes that are worth 
exploring. 
For the purposes of information and data gathering, I will primarily rely on 
secondary sources, particularly for the historical, background information, as they offer a 
more objective analysis of the political and economic history of Haiti. I will also use 
some government reports as primary sources, especially while trying to assess the 
effectiveness of the current Haitian government. 
F. OVERVIEW AND FINDINGS 
This thesis will consist of four chapters. The first chapter will begin with an 
overview of the relevance and benefits of the study of developmental assistance in Haiti. 
It will discuss the general background information found in literature about the amounts 
and types of developmental assistance provided to Haiti. It will conclude with an 
introduction to the organization of the rest of the thesis and the methods that will be used 
to evaluate the effectiveness of developmental assistance efforts. 
The second chapter will focus on the evolution of governmental leadership and 
economic progress in Haiti. This chapter will begin by discussing how Haiti became 
 11 
prosperous as a French colony and how the economy collapsed following Haiti’s 
independence. It will continue by discussing the governmental struggles over the next 
100 years until the United States occupied Haiti in 1915 and provided some stability to 
the Haitian government. The chapter will conclude with the end of the United States 
occupation until the end of the Aristide regime in 2004. This section will include portions 
on François (“Papa Doc”) Duvalier, Jean-Claude (“Baby Doc”) Duvalier, the Military 
Junta from 1991–1994, and both of Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s terms in office. The 
Duvalier’s reign, the junta, and President Aristide’s time in office are the most influential 
factors in shaping the current Haitian government.   
The third chapter will present an evaluation of the three hypotheses. This chapter 
will begin with a summary of reliance on foreign aid prior to the 2010 earthquake. The 
chapter will continue with the explanation of the disbursement of aid received since the 
2010 earthquake and the plans for funds committed to Haitian development and recovery 
that have not yet been received. It will continue by discussing the Haitian government 
under current President Michel Martelly. It will continue with an analysis of NGO 
operations and accountability in properly distributing aid to the Haitians. This chapter 
will conclude by analyzing how the Haitian citizens are utilizing the aid once it was 
received.  
The final chapter will summarize the use of the developmental assistance Haiti 
received and present an analysis of the ineffectiveness of that assistance. It will present 
the progress made in Haiti as a result of these contributions and make recommendations 
for future assistance. Very few countries have received as much developmental aid as 
Haiti has, especially in the Western Hemisphere. Even with all of the aid received, Haiti 
is still bordering on becoming a failed state. This chapter will contend that Haiti’s 
inability to prosper is a result of influential NGOs manipulating the governmental 
leadership at the expense of the impoverished Haitian masses.   
With a long, proud history of independence, as well as poverty, the Haitian people 
are unlikely to either look for or accept any long term outside intervention in the way 
Haiti’s government is run; however, it is in the best interest of the United States to ensure 
 12 
that the developmental aid Haiti receives is being used responsibly so that Haiti can 
become a stable nation and economic trading partner and not a security concern. 
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II. HAITI’S GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMY 
Haiti has a population of nearly 10 million people with the vast majority being 
extremely poor with a small minority that is extremely wealthy. Even though over 90 
percent of Haitians are of African descent, this demographic possesses little economic or 
political power.42  Despite recent efforts made to increase the level of education in Haiti, 
the literacy rate of the peasant population is the lowest in the Western Hemisphere and 
among the lowest in the world.43  The Haitian mulatto elite are wealthy, cultivated, and 
cosmopolitan even though they make up less than 3 percent of the population.44  The 
elite class rarely seeks political election, but they use their economic influence to control 
those that are elected. Haiti also has a small middle class consisting primarily of 
immigrants, which has had a negligible effect on the political and economic landscape in 
Haiti.45 
After centuries of squalor and mismanagement, Haiti is now considered a fragile 
state, and it is on the verge of becoming a failed nation state. Haiti quickly went from 
being the most profitable colony in the Western hemisphere to its current, deplorable 
state after achieving independence from France over 200 years ago. Understanding why 
Haiti failed to recover can best be explained by examining the history of the Haitian 
government and economy. 
A. SPANISH RULE: 1492–1697 
On his first voyage to the Americas in 1492, Christopher Columbus landed on 
Haiti’s northern coast. Columbus called the Island “Ysla Española,” which quickly 
became the Latinized version, Hispaniola. According to Columbus, the natives were 
“lovable, tractable, peaceable, gentle, [and] decorous.”  The native population existed in 
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communal societies that worked together for the survival of their populations. There was 
no discernable external trade or commerce. Columbus also described the natives as 
completely defenseless, cowardly, and lacking military skills but aptly fit to take orders 
and do work. In the opinion of the Spanish, Hispaniola was just an island of gold and 
slaves.46 
Before departing Hispaniola, one of Columbus’ ships, the Santa María, hit a coral 
reef off Cap Haïten, forcing him to leave a settlement of forty volunteers. The initial 
settlement would never be seen again; after returning, Columbus would find “nothing but 
ruins and carcasses where he had left fortifications and Spaniards.”47  This would be the 
first documented example of Haitians resisting foreign occupation. Upon his return, 
Columbus established another settlement on the southeast coast of Hispaniola called 
Isabella, which Spain developed into a colony that later became Santo Domingo. This 
colony became a staging point for expeditions and provided supplies for Spanish 
conquistadors.48   
The Spaniards forced the natives into slave labor under the guidance of 
Bartholomew Columbus who was the first governor of Hispaniola and the brother of 
Christopher Columbus. The initial population of Hispaniola was estimated to be around 3 
million people, although this number was likely exaggerated. The native population was 
reduced to barely 60,000 by the time a census was conducted in 1508. The number 
shrank to 14,000 by 1514; and there were only 600 natives in 1533. In 1550, there were 
only 150 native Indians left. The local slave labor was unsustainable in Hispaniola due to 
epidemics and enslavement from the Spanish colony.49   
The need for workers resulted in the import of a large amount of slave labor from 
Africa. The majority were Bantus from Angola and Congo. There were also many 
Guineans. The Senegalese were rare but prized for their height and warlike nature. The 
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loss of the indigenous population and inflow of Africans gave Hispaniola a mixed 
population dominated by European whites, African blacks, and mulattoes, with only an 
insignificant remaining native population.50 
African slaves were much more productive than their Indian counterparts, but 
they also fought slavery and sought opportunities for freedom much more proactively. 
The first official Africans arrived in Hispaniola in 1502 although there were already some 
in Hispaniola, possibly brought by Columbus himself. By 1503, the slaves started to steal 
from their masters and run away in gangs into the mountains, called “marronage.”  These 
actions of independence and indignation would create a culture that would be repeated 
throughout Haiti’s history.51 
In the mid-1500s, Spain moved its administrative center from Santo Domingo to 
Mexico after the conquest and the establishment of New Spain. Despite modest gold 
deposits discovered on the initial landing, Hispaniola was quickly depleted of its gold 
reserves. Mexico and Peru offered the gold the Spanish explorers were after; Hispaniola 
had plantations of sugar, coffee, tobacco, and cotton but no precious metals. Spain 
focused more attention elsewhere in the new world and essentially abandoned the western 
third of Hispaniola.52   
During the late 1500s, French, Dutch, and British forces increasingly threatened 
naval superiority over the Spanish navy, which made protecting weak colonies like Santo 
Domingo from pirates even more difficult. Complicating matters, French and British 
merchants would arrive in Spanish ports and illegally undersell Spanish merchants. In 
response, the King of Spain placed a rigorous embargo on Hispaniola dismantling all 
ports except the port in Santo Domingo. The result was disastrous for the inhabitants of 
Hispaniola. The colonists that stayed were left poor and idle, mostly living off the land in 
homes without furniture and without clothes. During this period, Spain demonstrated an 
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unwillingness to take care of its colony or citizens, which only increased the opportunity 
for a future revolt.53 
French Huguenots from the neighboring island of Tortuga began to settle what 
would later become Haiti during the mid-1600s, realizing the value of the island was in 
the fertile soil and the people that tended it. The Spanish were focused on seeking gold 
elsewhere and had already demonstrated little interest in creating and protecting colonies 
that failed to produce gold. From 1630–1659 Western Hispaniola would change hands 
several times among the English, Dutch, and French. In 1659, King Charles II of Spain 
relinquished control of the western portion of Hispaniola to Louis XIV as royal governor. 
This would begin 130 years of French dominion in Haiti, which the French named St. 
Domingue.54 
B. FRENCH RULE: 1697–1791 
During the 1700s, the French colony of Haiti grew and prospered. Haiti was 
producing over half of the coffee in the world and 40 percent of the sugar for France and 
Britain. It accounted for 40 percent of France’s trade when France was the most dominant 
economy in Europe. Haiti was able to achieve prosperity but only through slavery. Prior 
to the French Revolution, there were an estimated 500 to 700 thousand slaves in Haiti, 
primarily from the west central region of African. The mortality rate in Haiti was very 
high due to the rigorous demands of plantation labor in addition to the epidemics endemic 
to the region.55   
White slaveholders dominated the African slave population for over a century. As 
a result, a subpopulation of mulattoes was created between the white male masters and 
the African women. These offspring of white elite were granted special privileges that 
allowed them to accumulate some land and wealth. The mulattoes occupied a distinct 
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social class definitely inferior to the white social elites but holding considerably more 
rights than the pure African slaves.56 
The end of the 18th century was a dynamic time in the Western World, with the 
American Revolution and the French Revolution both directly influencing Haiti. Until 
1776, there had not been a successful colonial revolt. The independence achieved by the 
United States planted the idea among Haitians that a revolution against a remote colonial 
power was possible. Prior to the French Revolution, the idea of a revolt in Haiti seemed 
unlikely due to the power and influence France had over the small island nation. All Haiti 
had known since the arrival of Columbus was an existence of slavery and colonial rule. 
Any thoughts of an uprising would be quelled by reinforcements from France; however, 
while the French Revolution was taking place in mainland France, the Haitian colonists 
were largely left to fend for themselves. 
C. THE HAITIAN REVOLUTION: 1791–1804 
In 1791, a faction of African leaders initiated a slave rebellion changing the 
political landscape in Haiti. The initial revolt in northern Haiti was unsuccessful resulting 
in two thousand whites massacred, ten thousand blacks killed, and the destruction of 
approximately one thousand plantations.57  These actions incited further rebellions of 
mulattoes in southern and western Haiti.    
Haiti remained under French control. The French National Assembly decreed that 
Haiti would grant equal rights to the mulattoes.58  Instead of easing tensions, this edict 
created a division between the white Haitians that accepted the decisions of the 
revolutionaries in Paris and those that rejected them. The Haitian Revolution devolved 
into a melee with regional conflicts between black slaves and white masters, mulattoes 
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against white administrators, and black royalists against the white republicans and the 
mulatto republicans.59 
Francois-Dominique Toussaint Louverture was an integral leader of the Haitian 
Revolution that would shape the future of Haiti. Toussaint was a black slave to a family 
that provided him with an education. At a young age, he was inspired by the writings of 
Raynal and the prophesy of a “black Spartacus,” which Toussaint aspired to become. 
After arranging for the departure of his master’s family from Haiti, Toussaint joined the 
rebellion and quickly rose to positions of prominence as one of the few black leaders that 
could read and write.60 
The uprising ended in April 1793 at Cap Francais when the Republican French 
forces, aided by thousands of blacks, defeated the white royalists. As a reward for their 
service, the black recruits were awarded their freedom. The republican French 
administrator of Haiti would abolish slavery for the entire country in August 1793.61 
Haiti was in upheaval with France still maintaining a tenuous ability to govern the 
nation. Even though the royalists had been defeated, not all of the rebellion leaders 
elected to join the republican French administrators of Haiti. Toussaint was one of the 
three rebellion leaders that committed their support to representatives of the Spanish King 
in Santo Domingo.62  The Spanish authorities provided supplies for two armies led by 
black Haitians, including one by Toussaint himself; however, he switched his allegiance 
back to the French Republicans after Spain failed to deliver on its promise of abolishing 
slavery in the territory it had captured.63  
France and Spain signed a treaty in July 1794 that returned the western part of 
Hispaniola that Spain had occupied to France.64  As a result, Spain no longer provided 
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supplies to black royalist troops in Haiti, leading them to disband and join forces with 
Toussaint.65   
In 1796, French Republican troops faced another uprising, but Toussaint 
intervened, uniting the whites, blacks, and mulattoes, to peaceably settle the dispute.66  
In recognition of his stature and appreciation for his actions, he was appointed as the 
lieutenant governor of Haiti. He would later be promoted to the commander of all French 
forces in Haiti. Toussaint appointed a mulatto commander, Rigaud, to further secure the 
allegiance of the mulatto forces. Allegiance being erratic in Haiti, he would later 
negotiate a truce with the British forces and expel the French commissioner. In 1800, 
Rigaud’s forces rebelled against Toussaint but were soundly defeated. Rigaud left in exile 
allowing Toussaint to successfully consolidate his power over all of Hispaniola. When 
Haiti released its new constitution in 1801, Toussaint was declared governor-general for 
life.67 
As much as Toussaint was regarded as a hero in Haiti, he was considered a villain 
in France. Napoleon Bonaparte sent between 16 and 20 thousand troops to Haiti in 1802 
to regain control of the island.68  Aided by white and mulatto troops, the French forces 
attritted Toussaint’s army forcing him to surrender. Toussaint was taken to France as a 
prisoner and died in jail soon after.69 
The regained French rule would not last long in Haiti. Napoleon restored slavery, 
which incited Haitian leaders to rebel against France. France also got into another war 
with Britain. To fund the war, France sold Louisiana to the United States, eliminating the 
strategic importance of holding Haiti. Napoleon withdrew his military assets from Haiti, 
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which left control of Haiti in the hands of Haitian General Jean-Jacques Dessalines. Haiti 
declared its independence from France on January 1, 1804.70 
Independence came at a high cost for Haiti. Slaves were granted freedom from 
tyranny, but the economic controls put in place by the French would cease to exist. The 
greater cost would begin to be realized in 1825 when the Haitian government agreed to 
pay indemnity to the French planters for the lost land and slaves during the revolution. 
The substantial debt now owed to France would economically cripple Haiti from that 
point forward.71 
D. POST-REVOLUTION HAITI: 1804–1915 
As leader of the Haitian forces and hero of the Revolution, General Dessalines 
declared himself Emperor of Haiti in September 1804. Haiti ratified its constitution on 
May 20, 1805, which declared Dessalines emperor for life and gave him the right to name 
his successor.72 
Toussaint and Dessalines were very distinctly different leaders. Toussaint rose to 
prominence as the liberator of Haiti; he sought liberty and unification. He worked to 
rebuild Haiti’s infrastructure, revitalizing commerce, developing administration, and 
rebuilding the road system. Dessalines came as the invader with the primary focus of 
remove every last influence the French had remaining in Haiti.73 
Dessalines’ leadership over Haiti was characterized by massive human rights 
violations and failed attempts at progress. His most defining act was the 1804 Haiti 
Massacre where between February and April 1804 Dessalines had all of the whites living 
in Haiti killed. Dessalines was born into slavery, served a white master for 30 years, and 
seen many atrocities. He did not trust the whites, particularly the French. Afterwards, 
Dessalines declared Haiti an all-black nation and whites were forbidden from owning 
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property or land in Haiti. Although this decision was a cornerstone of the newly formed 
culture of Haiti, it would restrict economic opportunities for the nation for centuries. 
Haiti still resists allowing whites to immigrate to Haiti and owning and operating 
business in the country over 200 years later.74 
As drastic and grotesque as the Haiti Massacre was, this measure served several 
purposes. First, it was retribution for not only the wrongs committed against Dessalines 
himself but also all of human rights violations carried out by the white colonists against 
the blacks in Haiti since Columbus landed in 1492. Second, it sent a message to France 
that Haiti is no longer a French colony. There were no longer any ties to France; that 
period of Haitian history had ended. 
Dessalines faced substantial challenges in trying to keep the sugar industry 
running and plantation crops producing after slavery was abolished in Haiti. Although 
merchants from Britain and the United States were welcomed, foreign trade was tightly 
regulated. Dessalines resorted to harsh treatment of plantation labor. All blacks were 
required to work either as soldiers or on the plantations. Enforcing this directive, many 
blacks felt they were still enslaved, realizing little difference between the Haiti under 
French rule or that of Dessalines.75   
The Dessalines administration needed literate and educated people to be national 
officials and manage national affairs. At the time, the only well-educated Haitians were 
disproportionately the light-skinned elite, known as gens de couleur. Although there was 
really no alternative, this decision reintroduced a racially divided, class warfare into the 
newly formed Haiti.76   
Dessalines died October 17, 1806. Although the details are uncertain, he did not 
die of natural causes. As the first leader of an independent Haiti, Dessalines set several 
precedents that would become engrained in Haiti’s culture. First, he declared himself 
ruler for life and was allowed to appoint his successor without a democratic election. 
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Although the constitution would limit terms of future governors to five year terms, 
instead of setting the precedent and establishing a democratic election process himself, 
Dessalines put himself above the constitution. Had Haiti introduced the democratic 
process from the beginning, following the example of the United States, Haiti’s 
government may have adopted the democratic process and replaced their elected 
Presidents through term expiration instead of forcibly removing him. Second, Dessalines 
used force and human rights violations to consolidate his power. This was a dangerous 
precedent set that has been repeated throughout Haiti’s history. Finally, Dessalines 
created an elite class that was separate from the ethnic majority of the population. Haiti 
would struggle economically without slavery, forcing the masses into poverty and 
allowing the elites to determine where and how any aid money gets spent. The creation of 
this elite class may be the most important lasting legacy of the Dessalines era. 
E. UNITED STATES MILITARY INTERVENTION IN HAITI AND 
AFTERMATH: 1915–1957 
Between 1804 and 1915, Haiti had 26 presidents. Out of these first 26 presidents, 
only one would complete his full term; everyone else was either overthrown or died in 
office.77  There was no stability or continuity within the Haitian government, and there 
were no economic successes to support the nation. The great wealth previously found in 
Haiti was destroyed during the war of independence and what remained gradually 
deteriorated due to neglect.78  Independent subsistence farming replaced large-scale 
agriculture. Despite the efforts of the government to maintain the economy, plantations 
were abandoned; sugar mills, roads, aqueducts, and irrigation systems brought by the 
French deteriorated from lack of use. Although the infrastructure was in place, Haitian 
peasants were content doing subsistence farming and were unenthusiastic about working 
for wages.79 
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Due to Haiti’s location, it could serve as a strategic potential naval base for either 
the United States or any other imperialist power looking to exploit Haiti’s instability. As 
early as 1868, the annexation of both Haiti and the Dominican Republic was suggested 
by President Andrew Johnson in order to secure an economic stake in the West Indies as 
well as preventing foreign occupation. At the end of the 19th century, the United States 
unsuccessfully tried to lease one of Haiti’s northern cities, Mole-Saint Nicolas, as a naval 
base. The United States also tried economic intervention, offering a large loan in 1910 in 
hopes that Haiti could reduce the amount of foreign influence it faced by paying off its 
international debt.   Due to the size of the debt and the instability of the country, the 
attempt was futile.80 
The United States was working hard to eliminate foreign influence in the 
Caribbean, using the Spanish-American War to expel the Spanish and occupying Cuba 
twice between 1900 and 1910.81  The United States was using the Monroe Doctrine to 
ensure there would be no European Intervention in the Caribbean. The instability in the 
Haitian government was becoming a crisis as seven presidents were assassinated or 
overthrown in Haiti between 1911 and 1915.82  The instability in Haiti was a great 
concern for the United States and was also the object of foreign aspirations, particularly 
of the Germans and French.83 
In July 1915, the United States invaded Haiti and held the island nation under 
military occupation for 19 years. During this occupation, Haiti underwent a drastic 
transformation. Haiti was forced into ratifying a new constitution, the legislature was 
dissolved, a president favorable to the United States was elected through manipulated 
elections, and the Haitian military was reorganized and restructured in the mold of the 
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United States Marines. American officials commandeered Haiti’s finances in an effort to 
address Haiti’s debt more efficiently.84 
The United States intervention was met with mixed results. Some of the Haitian 
elite initially cooperated with the Americans, while many other elites were much more 
cautious and unwilling to join forces. There was also a group called Cacos that formed an 
armed insurgency. Initially small and insignificant, the Cacos grew as the population 
increasingly rebelled against the United States occupation.85 
There were several causes of the dissention between the Haitians and Americans. 
At the peasant level, the newly formed Haitian military was racially segregating the 
population, censoring the press, and coercing them into forced labor to meet the 
economic expectations of the Americans.86  At the highest levels was the unwillingness 
of the American marines to distinguish between the Haitian elites and peasants. The elite 
class took pride in keeping their Western orientation and tried to emulate refined white 
western culture. The marines made no distinction between blacks or mulattoes or 
between the educated or uneducated and instead treated all Haitians as Negroes. The 
elites, shocked and insulted, turned to the black African heritage of the masses. This was 
a sort of reawakening of black ethnical awareness in Haiti.87 
Out of adversity arose opportunity. François Duvalier took the opportunity to 
write articles on Haitian ethnology and emerged as a champion of Black Nationalism. 
Duvalier’s writings bridged the gap between the government and the masses challenging 
Haiti since French colonialism. Haiti still faced political and economic challenges, but 
they were now united, and the enemy was the United States.88 
The United States tried to give an American solution to a Haitian problem. Even 
though the Haitian solution was obviously not working, the Haitian people were not 
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going to accept an external solution to their problem. Complicating the situation was the 
lack of empathy shown by the occupying force and a lack of appreciation for the 
complexity of the situation to think that it could be solved in a relatively expedient 
manner using force and intimidation. A series of strikes and uprisings in 1929 led the 
United States to start withdrawing forces from Haiti, which set the stage for an official 
withdrawal in 1934 under President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy.89 
When the United States departed Haiti, it was treated as a second independence. 
Unlike 1804, however, in 1934 Haiti was much more suited for success. When Haiti 
initially gained independence, it was wrecked and ravaged by war. Few nations in history 
had ever been less prepared for nationhood than Haiti. In 1934, Haiti had a functioning 
bureaucracy, a disciplined apolitical military force, and an incumbent administration of 
educated men constitutionally elected, as opposed to the appointed former slaves that 
came to power following the previous independence.90 
As many parallels as there were between Haiti’s two independences, the more apt 
comparisons come from the condition of the country twenty-three years later. Sadly, the 
Haiti of 1957 would be very similar to the Haiti of 1827. As Heinl accounts:  
In 1827, Haiti was in general ruin with fields of dead crops; the inherited 
infrastructure from the French, including roads and bridges, were gone; the cities were 
ruined; the seaports were closed or decayed; the economy was at a standstill; the army 
was in miserable deterioration; political institutions were deadlocked; and there was a 
race war between the blacks and mulattoes.91 
Just like in the early 1800s, the progress of the mid-1930s had disappeared by the 
mid-1950s. Roads and bridges built by the Americans no longer existed. Agricultural 
exports, Haiti’s main exports, had dropped 20 percent in the past decade and were still in 
decline. The phone system no longer worked. Ports were not maintained. The inlets were 
filled with silt. The ports lacked lighting and became obstructed with shipwrecks. The 
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docks were rotting. Sanitation and electrification were in gross decline. The military and 
political institutions were in disarray. There were bitter conflicts among the classes, 
races, and political regimes. Newly elected President François Duvalier remarked that 
Haiti was “rotting in poverty, hunger, nudity, sickness, and illiteracy.”92 
F. THE DUVALIERIST REGIMES: 1957–1986 
The legacy of the Duvalierist regimes would be one of terror and political 
consolidation, as well as a return to the “négritude” of Haiti. When François Duvalier was 
elected President of Haiti in 1957, Haiti once again had a chance to rewrite its’ history; 
however, the man that Haiti elected president was not the man he appeared to be. 
François Duvalier was always well dressed in a formal and conservative manner. He was 
a soft-spoken, black physician of only five-feet-six inches and 150 pounds that had 
studied in America. Duvalier was greatly dedicated to Haiti’s history and folk culture, 
including a strict dedication to the traditional practices of Haiti’s Voodoo religion.93   
Since achieving independence, Haitians have given nicknames to their leaders. 
Duvalier was different. He titled himself “Papa Doc.”94  This would be an indication of 
the imposition of his will on the Haitian people as well as providing the people a kind 
mask to place on a terrorist. Duvalier ran on a reformist platform, but he would become 
another one of many Haitian politicians that would promise the peasant the most and 
deliver him the least.95  
During his campaign, he was thought to be a fool and the military regarded him as 
a puppet that could be easily manipulated.96  Despite his perceived ineptitude, he was 
backed by the United States as the most middle-of-the-road reformer and the best 
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candidate.97  In less than a decade after becoming president, he would be known 
primarily for his brutality and greed, which made Haiti even worse than Castro’s 
Communist Cuba.98   
Duvalier had a particularly complex personality, marked by extreme paranoia that 
resulted in mistrust and, above everything else, a need for violence.99  Some of his 
paranoia was justified. Like many Haitian presidents, he was the target of bomb 
explosions, terrorism, strikes, conspiracies, and invasions of the presidential palace.100  
His response was much more extreme than his predecessors, using the police and military 
to protect the president against the “enemies of the nation,” which was any Haitian that 
opposed the views of Duvalier.101 
Soon after election, Duvalier would create a secret police force called the 
cagoulards, which would eventually become the notorious Tonton Macoutes.102  This 
group was assigned the activities that Duvalier did not want linked back to him. 
Duvalier’s violence was swift and efficient. During his regime, he effectively eliminated 
all of his competition through violent intimidation.103 
Duvalier also prioritized the return of négritude in Haiti. He believed that Haiti 
should embrace its African origin and reject the overtures of assimilation into Euro-
American cultures.104  Duvalier would later be criticized by the founder of négritude for 
his interpretation as a conflict between races instead of between the ruling class and the 
masses. Despite his outward stance on négritude, Duvalier violated his own principles by 
including several mulattoes in prominent positions in his cabinet.105 
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After consolidating his power and eliminating all competition, Duvalier declared 
himself “President-for-Life” in 1964. Upon his death in April 1971, his son and 
personally designated successor, Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, became president. 
Baby Doc would continue to terrorize and politically oppress the Haitian people 
throughout his reign, although to a lesser extent than his father.106 
Jean-Claude Duvalier not only curbed some of the violent actions that 
characterized his father’s reign, but he also was able to make some economic advances, 
particularly in the early years of his time in power. Agricultural production increased, 
capital investment grew, and tourism improved, resulting in a real growth in the economy 
of 5 percent per year and gaining favorable assessments from the United States.107 
Despite his economic success, Baby Doc lacked the connection to the Haitian 
people his father had developed. Duvalier had spent most of his life in the presidential 
palace and was accustomed to the privileges of being the leader of the Haitian elite. He 
did little to mask his profiteering, allocating hundreds of millions of dollars to private 
bank accounts and affording his a lavish lifestyle at the expense of his people. Making 
matters worse, he revived the mulatto influence in Haiti selecting a mulatto wife and 
bringing in high level technological experts that opened Haiti to the Euro-American 
culture his father tried to limit. By the early 1980s, he had lost the support of the black 
middle class and had to rely on the support of the business community.108   
While Haiti’s economy improved throughout the 1970’s, Baby Doc was tolerated 
and even embraced as president; however, as economic conditions began to decline, his 
political standing also declined. When Pope John Paul II condemned the Duvalier regime 
in 1983, the people rebelled.109  Although it would take several years to remove him 
                                                 
106 Jerbi, Political Parties and Democracy in Haiti, 40. 
107 David Nichols, “Haiti: The Rise and Fall of Duvalierism,” Third World Quarterly 8, no. 4 (1986): 
1241. 
108 Ibid., 1241–1242. 
109 “From Duvalier to Avril, 1957–89,” Library of Congress, accessed June 17, 2014, 
http://countrystudies.us/haiti/65.htm.  
 29 
from office, President Duvalier went into exile in 1986 ending the Duvalier reign in Haiti. 
During this era, an estimated 20,000 to 50,000 Haitians were murdered.110 
G. ARISTIDE AND HAITI’S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: 1986–2010 
A transitional government supported by the military provided order until elections 
were held in December 1990. Due to the political oppression of the Duvalier regimes, it 
took time for political parties to become established. There were several cancelled 
elections due to undue military influence and voter manipulation until a legitimate, 
democratic election could take place. 
The leading candidate and American choice, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was a 
liberation theology Roman Catholic priest. He was selected by 67% of the voters in 
elections that international observers believed to be largely free and fair. Despite his 
popularity among the masses, Aristide’s radical populist policies and the violence of his 
bands of supporters upset the elite class.111   In September 1991, Aristide was 
overthrown and forced into exile, first fleeing to Venezuela and later to the United 
States.112  
This began another period of instability in Haiti. Although Joseph Nerette was 
granted the title of Provincial President, this seemingly was more of a formality; military 
leader General Raul Cédras was generally viewed as Haiti’s leader. While Haiti’s 
president would change several times during Aristide’s exile, General Cédras would be a 
constant. During this period, there was severe violence and economic hardship. 
The coup also created a large increase in the number of refugees fleeing Haiti. 
The close proximity to Florida, large Haitian diaspora, and vast opportunities made the 
United States an ideal destination. Volumes were high at the onset of the coup, briefly 
subsided, and increased as the months went on, particularly after Bill Clinton was elected 
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President in 1993. The high number of migrants added pressure for the United States to 
intervene in Haiti. Eventually, the United States would intervene in Haiti, executing 
Operation Uphold Democracy, which successfully returned President Aristide to power 
without combat and allowed him to finish the remainder of his term as president. 113 
The success of Operation Uphold Democracy allowed President Aristide to return 
from exile in 1994 and gave Haitians a renewed hope for the future. Upon resuming his 
office as president, Aristide disbanded the military. Since the military had successfully 
executed numerous coups throughout Haiti’s history, the reaction was not completely 
irrational. The military had also been responsible for persecuting political opposition and 
undermining party institutionalization, impeding the democratic process.114  In the larger 
view of international politics, this decision is potentially problematic. A national military 
is essential in ensuring the sovereignty of a state. Without a standing military, Haiti has 
no means of defense from outside invasions. Based on Haiti’s past, it should be able to 
create a formidable militia of conscripts if the need should arise. Since this policy was 
adopted in 1994, the absence of a standing military has not been an issue in Haiti. 
Another concern is that the military was the only reliable way for blacks to increase their 
socioeconomic status in Haiti. Removing the military has eliminated these opportunities 
for advancement as well as further reducing the number of jobs available in Haiti.115 
Aristide concluded his presidential term in 1996. According to the constitution 
ratified in 1987, Haitians are ineligible to run for election in consecutive terms.116  
Aristide selected longtime friend and Prime Minister René Préval as his candidate of 
choice. Préval was elected with 87.9 percent of the vote, even though less than 28 percent 
of the eligible population voted.117 
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After the election, many Haitians were concerned that Aristide would continue to 
rule through his good friend Préval, a fear that ended up being justified. Préval ruled 
largely through the popularity of Aristide. As relationships became strained between the 
two political leaders, Aristide split off and formed an opposition party, taking nearly all 
of the members of Préval’s party with him.118   
Préval had a tumultuous presidency including many conflicts with the Parliament. 
In January 1999, Préval shut down Haiti’s parliament in an attempt to end the power 
struggle. Despite the conflicts, Préval was able to institute some economic reforms and 
ended up being a successful president. He became only the second Haitian to serve a full 
presidential term without Haiti being occupied by another country.119 
In November 2000, Aristide was easily re-elected. His popularity as Haitian 
leader had never waned during the interim. Despite his national popularity, Aristide 
continued to foster international contempt. Much of the disdain centered on Aristide’s 
claim that France had extorted over $21 billion dollars from Haiti by force and should 
give it back to the Haitians.120  In February 2004, the assassination of a gang leader 
began a period of violence in Haiti. Former members of the disbanded Haitian Army 
attempted a coup against Aristide. In an effort to suppress the violence and protect the 
president from a coup, the United States removed President Aristide and transported him 
to Africa. Even in Africa, Aristide remained popular and maintained great influence 
among the Haitian people. 
Elections in 2006 returned René Préval to the presidency. This was a major 
victory for the popular sector, and a harsh defeat for both Haiti’s elite class and the 
interim government.121  Democracy in Haiti was finally taking hold. The economy, 
affected by the worldwide crash in 2007–2008, had started to show promising signs. One 
could only wonder what disaster would befall Haiti next. 
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III. SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN HAITI  
In early January 2010, Haiti was still the poorest country in the Western 
Hemisphere, but conditions were slowly improving. Haiti made significant 
developmental progress in security, judicial reform, macroeconomic management, 
procurement processes and fiscal transparency, increased voter registration, and jobs 
creation as the economy had shown some signs of improvement.122  Haiti’s economy 
had been growing since 2004, even though the real capita GDP had declined 30% in the 
forty year period between the late 1960s and the early 2000s.123   
Even with its economy gradually improving, Haiti was still recovering from the 
destruction caused by several hurricanes in 2008. Over half of Haiti’s population (54%) 
was living on less than U.S.$1 per day, and 78% were living on U.S.$2 or less per day. 
Less than 20% of the population was getting the minimum daily ration of food as defined 
by the World Health Organization (WHO).124   
Haiti also faced a significant income distribution gap and was dealing with the 
challenge of poverty reduction. The wealthiest 20% of Haitians were receiving more than 
68% of Haiti’s total national income; meanwhile, the poorest 20% received less than 
1.5% of the national income. This accounted for the second largest income disparity in 
the world. Based on the level of income distribution inequality, the World Bank judged 
that utilizing economic growth to reduce poverty in Haiti was nearly impossible.125 
Haiti made an effort to decrease the income gap by passing a minimum wage law 
in 2009. The law mandated a two stage increase in minimum wages from U.S.$1.75 per 
day to U.S.$3.75 per day in 2010 and then to U.S.$5.00 per day in October 2012. 
                                                 
122 Maureen Taft-Morales and Rhoda Margesson, Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response, 
(Washington, DC: CRS, 2010), 2. 
123 Maureen Taft-Morales, Haiti: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns, (Washington, 
DC: CRS, 2009), 4. 




Workers in the textile mills would earn U.S.$5.25 per day. Even with the increased 
wages, the widespread inequality persisted with few perceptible changes in Haitian 
society.126 
In order to survive, many Haitians rely on remittances from family members 
living overseas. Due to the close proximity to the United States, there were around 1.7 
million Haitians and Haitian Americans living in the United States as of 2010.127  Haiti’s 
large diaspora annually send between U.S.$1.5 billion and U.S.$2 billion, which supports 
approximately one third of the population.128  
Due to the widespread poverty in Haiti, the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) designated Haiti as one of five countries to be included in its Fund for Special 
Operations in 2009. This fund committed a total of U.S.$4.4 billion to nations struggling 
financially, and Haiti received U.S.$511 million.129  The portion allocated to Haiti 
covered the debt that it had accumulated prior to 2004.130   
A. JANUARY 12, 2010: THE PORT-AU-PRINCE EARTHQUAKE 
Haiti would take another step backwards on January 12, 2010 when it was hit by a 
7.0 Richter-scale earthquake, the most devastating natural disaster ever to occur in the 
Americas. The epicenter of the earthquake occurred just 15 miles southwest of Port-au-
Prince in shallow waters in the Caribbean Sea, which made the surface tremors even 
stronger.131    
The results were devastating. Approximately 230,000 people died in the 
earthquake, 300,000 were injured, over 1.5 million were displaced from their homes, and 
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2 million were left needing food and assistance. There were roughly 285,000 homes 
destroyed, and damages to Haiti’s infrastructure were estimated to be U.S.$11 billion, 
including the Presidential Palace, the Parliament building, 15 out of 17 ministry 
buildings, and the Supreme Court.132 
President René Préval described conditions in Haiti immediately following the 
earthquake as “unimaginable” in an appeal for international aid. Basic services, including 
electricity and water, were nearly entirely disrupted. Loss of crucial infrastructure further 
complicated relief efforts. In addition to housing, numerous hospitals and schools were 
destroyed. The major road networks were either blocked or severely damaged, the control 
tower at the airport in Port-au-Prince was destroyed, and the main seaport was heavily 
damaged. There were also approximately 300 United Nations personnel lost in the 
earthquake, including the head of the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH).133 
The challenges of recovering from a natural disaster the size of the earthquake 
were overwhelming. International aid groups provided tents and tarpaulins to over a half-
million people, emergency food rations were delivered to 4.3 million people, and medical 
aid was provided to thousands of Haitians. Still, millions of Haitians were residing in 
camps that smelled of human waste and were forced to live under soaked bed sheets as 
their only source of shelter. The displaced Haitians were in dire need of continued 
support, having no means to produce their own food anytime soon and no long-term 
healthcare provisions.134 
At this point, the IDB committed to providing Haiti further financial relief. The 
devastating effects of the earthquake resulted in the decision to completely eliminate 
Haiti’s debt. Haiti’s remaining debts accumulated from 2004 through 2009 were 
cancelled by the IDB in September 2010, and Haiti was designated as a grant only 
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country in order to free Haiti from future indebtedness.135  The IDB board of governors 
committed to forgiving Haiti’s U.S.$484 million outstanding debt and also converted 
U.S.$144 million in undispersed loan balances into grants.136  This endowment allows 
Haiti to use the scarce resources it has to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of the 
country instead of servicing past debt. 
B. LEADERSHIP TRANSITION: THE MARTELLY ADMINISTRATION 
As the earthquake recovery was beginning, Haiti was due to hold presidential 
elections. President René Préval was entering the final months of his second and final 
constitutional term in office when the earthquake occurred. He was greatly criticized for 
not being more proactive and outspoken about the magnitude of the damage caused and 
the great need for assistance in Haiti. President Préval’s lack of advocacy following the 
earthquake, and the history of financial mismanagement in Haiti’s government, raised 
concerns about how honorably the President would leave office. Haiti’s presidents, Jean-
Claude Duvalier in particular, have had a history of reallocating funds intended for the 
betterment of Haiti into their personal accounts prior to leaving office.137  Even with the 
oversight from the United Nations on all of the aid money entering Haiti, alleviating 
President Préval of the temptation was a justifiable decision. 
The process to elect Préval’s successor began on November 28, 2010. The top 
two candidates in the primary election were Mirlande Manigat, a constitutional law 
professor and former first lady for President Leslie Maginat during one of the provisional 
presidential regimes immediately after the constitution was ratified, and Michel Martelly, 
a Haitian businessman and popular dance musician, particularly popular with the young 
voters. In the March 2011 runoff election, Martelly received 68% of the votes cast despite 
only 15% of the registered Haitian voters participating in the election.138   
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Martelly was inaugurated on May 14, 2011. The transition of power from 
President Préval to President Martelly marked the first time in Haiti’s history of a 
peaceful democratic transition of a democratically elected government leader to a 
member of the opposition party.139  The selection of Michel Martelly was a reason for 
concern for many Haitians and interested international groups. Although Martelly was a 
businessman, his financial skills were questionable. He had defaulted on over U.S.$1 
million in loans and had three properties in foreclosure in Florida.140  Of greater concern 
to many Haitians and members of the international community were President Martelly’s 
ties to the Duvalier regime. Martelly’s administration was and still is in opposition to the 
party of widely popular former President Aristide, and it employs several former advisors 
and members of Duvalier’s regime.141  With proper checks and balances, the Martelly 
administration could be kept accountable; however, having three fully functional 
branches of government has always been a problem in Haiti, which made accountability 
difficult. 
Under President Martelly, the interactions among the three branches of 
government in Haiti have gradually improved. Three members of Haiti’s Supreme Court 
have been selected by President Martelly. One of these appointments was the Supreme 
Court president, which is central to the judiciary’s oversight body and had been vacant 
for the past six years. As a result, Haiti now has an appointed and functional executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches for the first time in over 25 years.142 
The relationship between the President and the Senate has seen similar signs of 
progress. Immediately after election, congress sought ratification of several constitutional 
amendments. These include provisions for streamlining the process for creating a 
permanent electoral council and for allowing dual-citizenship Haitians the right to vote 
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and hold government positions, which had been a source of frustration among the Haitian 
diaspora. According to Haiti’s constitution, amendments that are passed by two 
consecutive legislatures go into effect when the next president takes office; however, 
there was a controversy over changed wording between the approved amendments and 
the amendments set to be published. After debating the issue, leaders of the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches worked together to publish a mutually acceptable 
version of the amendments, marking a great step forward in Haiti’s democratic 
process.143 
Even with the approved amendment for creating a permanent election council, the 
election process is threatening democracy in Haiti. Elections that should have taken place 
by January 2012 at the latest still have not taken place. Haiti’s Senate is designed to 
select one-third of its members during each election cycle to ensure continuity. Since 
May 8, 2012, Haiti’s Senate has been operating with only 20 of its members. With the 10 
Senate seats unfilled, achieving a 16-member quorum to conduct business has been a 
challenge. Despite the Prime Minister’s promises of holding elections by the end of 2012, 
elections have not been held. Elections are also long overdue for several other sectors of 
Haiti’s society, including local elections for municipal councils, town delegates, and 
other posts.144 
Haiti was scheduled to hold another round of elections on October 26, 2014. 
Hours after the polls were scheduled to open President Martelly announced the elections 
would not take place as scheduled. This round of elections was supposed to elect 20 
members of the Senate, the 10 seats vacant since 2012 and 10 seats that are set to expire 
in 2015, as well as the entire lower Parliament and numerous municipal officials. If 
elections are not held by January 15, 2015 and the terms of the next ten senators expire 
without any replacements, the senate will not have enough members to hold a quorum. 
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According to Haiti’s constitution, Parliament would dissolve and President Martelly 
would rule by decree in this increasingly likely scenario.145 
Political opponents of President Martelly claim he has sought the opportunity to 
rule by decree and promised elections only in an effort to gain favor within the 
international community. There is no concrete proof to substantiate this assertion. In 
Haiti, the congress is designated the responsibility of holding elections. President 
Martelly’s party does not hold a majority in the congress, and political gridlock has 
prevented progress towards holding elections. Martelly appears focused on keeping his 
legacy intact as the steward following the 2010 earthquake. He has even been supportive 
of the candidacy of his prime minister, Laurent Lamothe, as the next president.146 
Still, fears linger as there are ties between President Martelly and the Duvalier 
regimes. There is too much threat of a potential return to the authoritarian past that is so 
familiar to Haitian culture without having a either a parliament or a national military in 
place and having a supportive, personally appointed Supreme Court. One of the few 
remaining checks to hold President Martelly accountable is the reaction of the 
international community. If Haiti were not so reliant on foreign aid, there would be little 
opposition to President Martelly becoming a dictator in the mold of Duvalier or 
Dessalines. 
C. AID AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN RESPONSE TO THE 
EARTHQUAKE 
Despite fears of corruption and embezzlement, Haiti’s government has used its 
resources responsibly due to the constraints from the United Nations and the international 
community. Instead of a lot of governmental interference, what Haiti has been forced to 
handle is an uncoordinated response to a complex problem. There were approximately 
900 foreign and thousands of Haiti-based NGOs trying to provide support during the 
disaster relief efforts. These organizations tended to flock to the well-known 
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neighborhoods while neglecting many others, often with redundant services. The Haitian 
government was unable to create a coordinated response, but this is the way the 
international community designed Haiti’s government to operate since President Aristide 
was removed from power in 2004. The inability of Haiti’s government to respond to a 
crisis is partially the fault of the way the U.N. constrained the Haitian government.147 
There has been widespread blame for the inefficient disbursement of aid and 
recovery funds in Haiti. The Haitian government has been critical of the international 
donor community for the amount of time it has taken to deliver desperately needed funds. 
International donors blamed the delay in reconstruction efforts on the prolonged lack of a 
prime minister, ongoing gridlock in Haiti’s legislative and executive branches, and the 
inability to organize elections. Haiti wants funds to flow through the government instead 
of directly to NGOs. Donors are concerned about corruption and the Haitian 
government’s ability to design and implement programs.148 
The amount of money bypassing the Haitian government and flowing directly to 
NGOs became a major obstacle. Too much money was flowing into Haiti without any 
oversight. Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive has said, “The NGOs don’t tell us where 
the money is coming from or how they are spending it. Too many people are raising 
money without any controls, and don’t explain what they’re doing with it.”149 
In response to the earthquake, donors provided U.S.$2.2 billion of humanitarian 
aid. Approximately twenty percent of that went to the U.S. Department of Defense and 
the 22,000 troops sent to carry out the relief operation. In total, less than one percent of 
the humanitarian aid and 15 percent of the recovery aid went to Haiti’s government.150 
Although some NGOs have produced positive results in Haiti, there are many that 
ended up negatively impacting the local economy and the national infrastructure. Many 
privileged NGOs have been criticized for taking away human and monetary resources 
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from the state, threatening the stability of national institutions. By taking away these 
resources, the NGOs have taken away accountability of the government to the local 
Haitian citizens and decreased the ability to deliver needed aid in a timely manner.151   
The efforts of many NGOs and international aid organizations have been highly 
criticized for their inefficiency. Dieudonne Zidor, an elected official from an earthquake-
ravaged slum neighborhood outside Port-au-Prince, was particularly critical of how the 
American Red Cross managed the U.S.$20 million designated to improve her 
neighborhood, saying, “All they do is hold meetings and hand out juice. In the end, they 
will have spent the whole U.S.$20 million giving juice to the people.”152 
Bypassing governmental controls makes recovering from a natural disaster much 
more challenging. The government does not know what needs have been addressed and 
where there is still need. Especially in governments with limited resources, like Haiti’s, 
extra measures need to be emplaced before committing resources that may no longer be 
needed.   
Accountability of the incoming funds created further challenges. Even with U.N. 
and U.S. assurance that the NGOs receiving funds were closely monitored, during a crisis 
everything becomes more chaotic and quality control suffers. The U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) required reports from receipt groups about how their 
funds had been spent and how their projects were progressing; however, USAID is often 
a source of funds for additional NGOs to execute projects. A sizable portion of the aid 
money designated for Haitians went to foreigners, primarily American aid workers. 
Within the first few months following the earthquake, USAID paid at least U.S.$160 
million to the Department of Defense, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
local search and rescue teams, and itself.153   
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The funds given to international aid workers could have been used to create jobs 
for Haitians and support the rebuilding of Haiti’s infrastructure. In some cases, the aid 
organizations ended up hurting the Haitians they were designed to help. There were 
several occurrences where aid organizations bought food and other necessities from 
international sources instead of supporting the local economy. Buying food from highly 
subsidized sources and giving it to the Haitians drove many local farmers out of 
business.154 
In the months following the earthquake, foreigners took the lead on the 
reconstruction projects. With the amount of destruction and loss of life, Haitians were 
effectively excluded from the reconstruction coordination. Since the U.N. had already 
established a presence in Haiti through their MINUSTAH presence, coordination was 
taking place on the isolated and gated U.N. compound. Haiti’s government was weak 
before the earthquake and was further crippled afterwards, but Haiti still belonged to the 
Haitians. Many Haitians could never get over the idea that they were an afterthought in 
the reconstruction of their country.155 
Almost all of Haiti’s reconstruction projects were awarded to foreign agencies, 
nonprofit groups, and private contractors. These groups would then subcontract the work 
to others. The administrative cost for each level was around seven to ten percent, as the 
work was further subcontracted.156 
Foreign intervention caused further problems by the jobs they offered. 
Overcompensating for the oversight of excluding Haitians in the reconstruction planning 
when coordination began, the foreign teams offered high salaried jobs that appealed to 
many of the best-educated Haitians. These opportunities not only took the most capable 
Haitians away from government and private-sector jobs creating a leadership void but 
also brought back the preferential treatment of the mulatto elite class.157 
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Recovery efforts backed by the Haitian government and international donors 
focused on manufacturing and agricultural production. Both manufacturing and 
agriculture have made a steady recovery; however, the agricultural sector is limited by 
severe deforestation, with only an estimated 2% of Haiti’s forest cover remaining, 85% of 
the watersheds degraded, rural infrastructure being minimal or absent, and access to 
credit being extremely limited. In the midst of the recovery process, hurricane Sandy’s 
arrival in Haiti in 2012 did further damage to Haiti’s agricultural land. The U.N. 
estimated an additional U.S.$40 million would be needed to address the damage from 
hurricane Sandy. Despite the setback, Haiti’s exports to the United States are up 41% 
since 2010 due to job creation in the manufacturing sector, tens of thousands of Haitian 
farmers have higher incomes, crime rates are down, and security has improved.158 
The IDB has also committed to assisting in Haiti’s future financial security. 
Identifying the need for investments in reconstruction and long-term development, the 
IDB has pledged a total of nearly U.S.$2.34 billion in grants through 2020. Subject to 
annual approvals, the yearly allotment of U.S.$200 million is dedicated to projects in six 
critical sectors: education, water and sanitation, transport, energy, agriculture, and private 
sector development. Now Haiti’s leading multilateral donor, the involvement of the IDB 
since the earthquake has been a crucial part of the country’s recovery.159 
In addition to the support from the IDB, several nations committed funds to assist 
Haiti in its rebuilding efforts, which are expected to cost about U.S.$14 billion. During a 
donor’s conference held in March 2010, U.S.$5.3 billion was pledged for Haiti’s relief 
efforts; however, by August 2010, only Brazil, Norway, Australia, Colombia, and Estonia 
had followed through with their pledges. These five countries provided a total of 
U.S.$506 million to Haiti’s recover efforts, which is less than ten percent of the total 
pledged. In the early stages of the recovery process, when the need was most immediate, 
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Haiti was faced with the challenge of recovery without the benefit of the funds designated 
to accomplish the task.160 
Even by the end of 2012, the majority of the funds designated for Haiti’s relief 
and recovery had failed to reach the nation. Of the U.S.$13.34 billion allocated to relief 
and recovery efforts in Haiti from 2010–2020 by multilateral and bilateral corporations, 
only U.S.$6.43 billion or 48 percent has been dispersed. Private donors have contributed 
an additional $3.06 billion to UN agencies and NGOs, adding a total of U.S.$9.49 billion 
to Haiti’s economy. Between 2010 and 2012, the Government of Haiti generated 
revenues of only U.S.$3.17 billion. Tripling the national revenues combined with the 
forgiveness of Haiti’s debt by the IDB has given Haiti yet another opportunity to provide 
for its people, rebuild its infrastructure, and revive its economy.161 
Distribution of aid became a severe challenge. After the earthquake hit Haiti, over 
two million people were displaced from their homes and settled in temporary camps. In 
the subsequent seven weeks, nearly one-third of the camp dwellers reported not receiving 
any aid at all. Fifty-five percent had received some form of formal aid, typically just a 
tent or tarpaulin to provide shelter. Forty percent had received informal aid, which were 
mostly cash transfers from family members living abroad. Although the displaced 
Haitians were appreciative of any and all forms of aid they received, the most timely and 
effective aid was in the form of cash. That way, the people could determine their own 
needs and use the money to acquire it instead of receiving whatever happens to be 
donated.162 
Most of the blame for failing to distribute the aid coming into Haiti cannot be 
attributed to its government. Data collected by the United Nations special envoy to Haiti 
showed that U.S.$582.3 million of the total disbursed funds went through Haiti’s national 
systems for public financial management and procurement (NSPFM) between 2010 and 
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2012. This is less than ten percent of the U.S.$6.43 billion of public funds donated to 
Haiti. Only $22.5 million, or less than one percent, of the $2.41 billion designated as 
humanitarian aid went through Haiti’s government using the NSPFM. Properly providing 
for the greatest needs of the people and restoring faith in the government is challenging 
when such a large portion of aid is bypassing the established government systems for 
distribution and aid. Considering the past mismanagement of Haiti’s government and the 
immediate need of the people, the actions seem justifiable; however, the current 
government regime needs to be given the opportunity to earn the trust of the Haitian 
people and the international community in order to gain legitimacy.163 
Nearly three years after the earthquake, the chief accomplishment in Port-au-
Prince was that finally most of the rubble had been cleared away. For the U.S.$7.5 billion 
spent on Haiti’s relief effort, that does not seem like much of an accomplishment. Over 
half of the aid money spent in Haiti was on consumable goods and services, including 
short-term jobs, emergency food and water, transitional shelters, and temporary clinics 
and schools. Even deducting the consumable amount from the total investment in Haiti’s 
reconstruction more progress should have been achieved. When asked what went right 
and what went wrong, former Haitian Prime Minister Michéle Pierre-Louis answered, 
“Almost everything went wrong. When you look at things, you say, ‘Hell, almost three 
years later, where is the reconstruction?’  There needs to be some accountability for all 
that money.”164 
Former President Bill Clinton, the U.N. special envoy for Haiti, and U.S. 
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton urged donors to start working with the 
government and stop working around it. Safe, permanent housing, the most obvious and 
pressing need, received a mere U.S.$215 million. Donors shied away from the difficult 
and messy housing reconstruction and instead focused a large portion of the recovery 
funds on expensive current projects, like highway construction, H.I.V. prevention, 
creation of an industrial park in northern Haiti, and a new teaching hospital in the central 
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plateau. The result of the uncoordinated disaster response was a myriad of well-meaning 
projects with little lasting effect instead of making long-term investments to rebuild 
Haiti’s infrastructure.165 
In many instances, the problem was not a lack of money but the ability to spend it, 
which was a new problem for Haiti. Between the United States and the Red Cross, there 
was over U.S.$1.5 billion in the treasury dedicated for Haiti’s reconstruction, with 
another U.S.$85 million allocated by Spain to improve infrastructure so safe drinking 
water can be efficiently delivered. The challenges facing the Haitian government then 
became land and ideological disputes, logistical and contracting problems, staffing 
shortages, and weather. Although there were high unemployment rates and lots of work 
to do towards rebuilding Haiti, there were few skilled laborers able to help in the 
reconstruction.166 
Part of the problem was coordinating the logistics of the reconstruction effort. The 
money was ready to fund the projects, but the projects had to be contracted out and 
approved before reconstruction could take place. President Martelly aptly summed up the 
situation saying, “Building takes time; it’s destruction that’s rapid.”167 
Haiti is still in desperate need of outside investment. Failure to hold elections, 
especially if the result is the dissolution of parliament, would end a large portion of the 
international aid Haiti needs to continue the process of recovery and development. Haiti 
does not have the infrastructure in place to survive independently.168 
Even though there were brief periods of economic progress, Haiti is still suffering 
the effects of negative economic growth in three of the past four decades. Roughly 75 
percent of Haitians were unemployed or living off of the informal economy as of early 
2013. Due to the political risks in Haiti, big businesses are reluctant to make major 
commitments. Over 80 percent of college educated Haitians have left the country. The 
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mass emigration of skilled workers, aggravated inequality, persistent poverty, and high 
unemployment limit the ability of the Haitian citizens to exploit opportunities that could 
lead to economic growth.169 
President Martelly’s comments summed up Haiti’s collective disappointment: 
“Where has the money given to Haiti after the earthquake gone?  Most of the aid was 
used by non-governmental organizations for emergency operations, not for the 
reconstruction of Haiti. Let’s look this square in the eye so we can implement a better 
system that yields results. We don’t just want the money to come to Haiti. Stop sending 
money. Let’s fix it [the international relief system].”170 
D. SIGNS OF PROGRESS AND HOPE FOR THE FUTURE 
The destruction caused by the earthquake left approximately 10 million cubic 
meters of rubble. Within the first two years, over half of the rubble had been removed. 
Removal of the visible reminder of the destruction is a necessary step in allowing Haiti to 
move forward.171 
Two years after the earthquake, almost 1 million Haitians had left the camps and 
returned to structurally improved houses, temporary shelters, or permanent homes. 
Cooperative efforts between the U.S. government and USAID completed over 28,500 
shelters that house an estimated 143,000 Haitians. Repairs and renovations were made to 
an additional 6,000 structures that were deemed as structurally safe if repairs were made. 
As a result, over 40,000 Haitians have returned to those homes.172 
Haiti’s agriculture industry is beginning to rebound. Over 9,700 farmers have 
benefitted from improved seeds, technologies, techniques, and fertilizer through 
investments made in food security and agriculture. As a result, rice yields increased by 64 
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percent, corn yields improved a robust 338 percent, bean crops increased 97 percent, and 
plantains increased by 21 percent. For 8,750 of Haiti’s small farmers, incomes improved 
by over 50 percent.173 
As much damage as the earthquake caused, it seemed to draw the attention of 
international investors. These investors realized the potential market in Haiti in the 
months following the earthquake. As opportunities continue to arise, international 
investors have continued to increase their investments in the nation through the first few 
years of recovery. Approximately 1,000 business leaders from the private sector and 
government officials attended a multi-day symposium on business development 
opportunities in Haiti. There were representatives from 29 countries spanning Europe, 
Asia, and the Americas. One corporation, Marriot and Digicel, announced the 
construction of a 750 room hotel in Port-au-Prince that would bring in U.S.$45 million of 
construction and development revenue and boost Haiti’s tourist appeal.174 
Technological upgrades and an improved communication infrastructure are also 
contributing to investments in Haiti’s economy, especially among the Haitian diaspora. 
Companies like Zafen, a non-profit funding source that provides interest free loans to 
Haitian entrepreneurs unable to qualify for funding through donations, are giving 
Haitians a chance to create a niche in the local economy. Another company, Fonkoze, has 
grown into the country’s largest microfinance institution. Fonkoze has been extremely 
successful, due in large part to distributing the loans made by Zafen. Although reviving 
Haiti’s economy will take time, ventures like these will help to stimulate and develop 
local economies, with a lot of potential for future growth.175 
Perhaps the greatest reason to hope in the future of Haiti is the resilience of the 
Haitian people. Enduring dictators and natural disasters, living through centuries of 
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poverty and oppression, Haitians have shown the ability to adapt and survive 
anything.176   
Haiti has numerous needs that need to be met with the disaster relief funds that 
have not yet been dispersed, as well as future international relief funds that Haiti is 
scheduled to receive from the IDB. If Haiti is going to achieve economic prosperity in the 
near-term, it will have to allocate a large portion of these funds towards fostering proper 
security, education, and economic opportunities. Maintaining security is an essential step 
in fostering economic growth. Ensuring Haiti’s police force is properly prepared to 
accept the mission as the U.N. forces transition out will be essential in retaining stability. 
The future of Haiti will be dependent on educated Haitians both currently in Haiti and 
from the diaspora. Educational goals should focus on developing skill sets that are 
relevant to Haiti’s current and future needs. Additionally, growing economic 
opportunities in Haiti will give the people the most visible symbol of hope as job 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Humanitarian assistance provided by the international community can be 
considered a lifeline for any country following a major disaster. The aim of this thesis 
was to analyze the level of effectiveness of the development assistance that Haiti has 
received since 2010. Nearly five years after the earthquake, the following conclusions can 
be drawn: 
 
 There is a need for a coordinated international response that can focus 
solely on meeting the most immediate concerns of the affected nation. 
The international response to the earthquake in Haiti was a disaster. The 
government was bypassed due to fears of weakness and corruption, but any chance of 
restoring legitimacy and providing the opportunity to lead recovery efforts was lost. 
Haitians were excluded from the recovery planning process of their own country in favor 
of the international reconstruction experts. National priorities were not taken into 
consideration as the aid and reconstruction money were allocated to different projects. 
Many privileged NGOs were awarded large contracts that were subcontracted with high 
administrative fees, benefitting the NGOs and not the Haitian people. The reconstruction 
efforts were uncoordinated and haphazard. Redundant services were provided in some 
locations while other locations were ignored. Some areas received an abundance of a 
certain type of aid but could not get the aid needed (i.e., having access to food but not 
shelter).   
 
In the future, having a particular organization designated as being responsible for 
disaster response coordination with the affected government would be beneficial. 
Whether this entity is the United Nations, the Red Cross, a nation designated as the lead 
agent, or another organization, there should be a response team that has the authority to 
coordinate with the affected nation’s government to prioritize responses to the disastrous 
event. This type of entity would be particularly valuable in places where the government 
is weak or fragile to begin with and in places where the nation’s government is disrupted 
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by the natural disaster. Haiti would qualify in both scenarios. The designated entity 
would then be responsible for ensuring that allocated funds are disbursed responsibly, 
both for the greatest need of the nation and to meet the categorical requirements of the 
donated funds. 
 
 Controlling interest groups present a challenge to recovery and progress, 
especially when there are unexpected, large sums of money are brought 
into a nation. 
In Haiti, as in many other countries, the educated class is afforded the greatest 
opportunities and controls most of the wealth. When large sums of international aid 
designated for national assistance or recovery enter the country, strict oversights must be 
maintained to ensure the elite class is not procuring these funds for themselves at the 
expense of the intended recipient. The educated elite class in Haiti was repeatedly 
afforded opportunities that allowed them to increase their personal wealth at the expense 
of the government, the reconstruction efforts, and the poor, displaced Haitians that 
needed the funds to recover from the disaster. In a nation that was already suffering from 
wealth inequality and then experienced a crippling natural disaster, implementing a 
means of wealth re-distribution may be a rational option to ensure that everyone will 
work together for the benefit of national recovery. 
 
 Haiti’s culture will limit the acceptance of outside influence. 
Haiti has repeatedly shown an unwillingness to accept outside interventions, even 
when the results were a substantial improvement over the previous conditions. Most 
notably immediately after achieving independence from France and after the United 
States withdrew its forces in 1934, Haiti resented the advancements forced upon it and 
reverted to a dilapidated state. Increased globalization and cultural shifts may make the 
response of the Haitian people different in this situation; however, failure to see any 





 Elections need to take place to ensure continuity of international aid. 
Haiti finds itself at another crossroads in history. Haiti’s national debt has been 
cancelled by the IDB. There are aid and recovery funds still available waiting for the 
bureaucracy of proper contracting and procurement of skilled labor to enact the much 
needed improvements to infrastructure in Haiti. Furthermore, more international 
assistance funds are scheduled to be delivered to help aid the revival of Haiti’s economy. 
The fact that parliamentary elections have been scheduled for the past two years, and 
have not taken, place represents a threat to Haiti’s future.   
Haiti’s government has repeatedly regressed from democratic rule into a 
dictatorship; unless substantial progress is made towards holding democratic elections in 
the immediate future, Haiti may once again become a dictatorship. If elections do not 
take place by January 2015, Haiti’s parliament will be disbanded, and President Martelly 
will rule by decree. Historically, when a Haitian president takes the opportunity to rule by 
decree, he declares himself dictator for life. This happened with President Dessalines in 
the early 1800s and with President François Duvalier in the mid-twentieth century. Since 
President Martelly is a Duvalierist, he may be inclined to follow in their footsteps.   
The situation in Haiti must be closely monitored for the next year. Presidential 
elections are scheduled to take place at the end of 2015. According to Haiti’s constitution, 
elections must be directed by the parliament. If and when parliament gets disbanded, 
President Martelly will have the authority to direct elections. If President Martelly acts in 
good faith towards continuing the democratic governance of Haiti, there should be no 
reason to suspend aid to the country; however, if President Martelly does not make an 
effort to re-establish the parliament or hold the regularly scheduled presidential elections, 
the decision to continue providing aid must be reassessed. 
 
 If Haiti does revert from a democracy into authoritarian rule and there is 
an intervention, the United States should be involved in the intervention. 
Due to the proximity and the large Haitian diaspora, if there is a future 
intervention in Haiti, the United States should be involved probably as the lead agent. 
Intervention should be part of an international coalition, likely under the direction of the 
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United Nations, and not a unilateral action. Even though Haiti possesses a minimal threat 
to United States security interests, its location provides an advantageous strategic position 
for staging troops if a future conflict should arise. Additionally, the lobbying of the 
diaspora to intervene on behalf of their native land could be a pivotal political issue in an 
upcoming election. 
 
 The impoverished masses of Haitian citizens will make a positive impact 
if given the opportunity. 
Haiti’s citizens have shown as great an ability to survive and endure as a culture 
as any people in history. They are willing to work together and will do whatever they can 
to improve their situation within the means available to them. Increasing educational 
opportunities, providing apprenticeship opportunities, and making available the resources 
to improve their communities is among the best investments Haiti can make to ensure its 
future prosperity. 
 
 Reforestation of Haiti will aid in national sustainability in the future. 
The deforestation of Haiti has left the nation with little remaining arable land and 
a high degree of soil erosion. Reforestation of Haiti will help improve the soil so farmers 
can grow sustainment crops and become less reliant on imported crops. Increasing food 
output in Haiti has numerous advantages in that it provides jobs for farmers, decreases 
the amount of money Haiti has to pay other nations for food, and provides locally grown 
food for Haitian citizens.   
 
 Globalization has proven to be both positive and negative for Haiti’s 
economy. 
Developing Haiti’s economy through companies like Zafen and Fonkoze has been 
a positive aspect of globalization. Investment opportunities in Haiti have increased and 
the opportunity for entrepreneurship in Haiti was correspondingly created. As these 
opportunities increase and take root, local economies will continue to progress resulting 
in greater future economic potential. 
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The negative aspects of globalization were highlighted during the relief response 
to Haiti’s earthquake. Relief organizations looked for the most economical source of food 
to provide the Haitian citizens. As a result, highly subsidized food sources were selected 
instead of procuring food from the local economy, which made farming no longer a 
viable source of income due to non-competitive prices. As the economy stabilizes and 
globalization increases in Haiti, the nation will have to evaluate the feasibility of 
providing subsidies, particularly for agricultural products. 
After nearly five years of investment in the recovery of Haiti, the results are far 
below expectations, but there are still several reasons for hope. Much of the disbursed aid 
has gone to meet the immediate aid of the Haitian citizens and has been consumed with 
no lasting effect. Too much aid money has gone to corrupt NGOs that have used the 
funds to further their controlling interests rather than to help the people they were 
designed to help. Yet there are still great amounts of money designated to aid Haiti’s 
future reconstruction. In Haiti there will always be needs to be met, but with every 
challenge there is an opportunity. I encourage everyone to stay committed to the 
reconstruction of Haiti and chase the opportunities it presents.   
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APPENDIX 
Table 1.   Presidents of Haiti178 
 
President Year(s) in Office Term In Office 
Jean Jacques Dessalines 1804–1806 Assassinated 
Henri Christophe 1807–1820 Suicide 
Alexander Pétion 1807–1818 Died in Office 
Jean Pierre Boyer 1818–1843 Overthrown 
Riviere Rivière-Hérard 1843–1844 Overthrown 
Philippe Guerrier 1844–1845 Died in Office 
Jean Louis Pierrot 1845–1846 Overthrown 
Jean-Baptiste Riché 1847–1847 Died in Office 
Faustin Soulouque 1847–1859 Overthrown 
Fabre Nicholas Geffrard 1859–1867 Overthrown 
Sylvain Salnave 1867–1869 Executed 
Saget Nissage 1870–1874 Served Full Term 
Michel Domingue 1874–1876 Overthrown 
Pierre Théoma Boisrond-Canal 1876–1879 Overthrown 
Lysius Felicite Salomon 1879–1888 Overthrown 
François Denys Légitime 1888–1889 Overthrown 
Florvil Hyppolite 1889–1896 Died in Office 
Tirésias Simon Sam 1896–1902 Resigned 
Alexis Nord 1902–1908 Overthrown 
François C. Antoine Simon 1908–1911 Overthrown 
Cincinnatus Leconte 1911–1912 Died in Office 
Tancrède Auguste 1912–1913 Died in Office 
Michel Oreste 1913–1914 Overthrown 
Oreste Zamor 1914 Overthrown 
Joseph Davilmar Théodore 1914–1915 Overthrown 
Vilbrun Sam 1915 Assassinated 
Philippe Sudré Dartiguenave 1915–1922 Served Full Term 
Louis Borno 1922–1930 Served Full Term 
Louis Eugène Roy 1930 Provisional 
Sténio Vincent 1930–1941 Served Full Term 
Élie Lescot 1941–1946 Overthrown 
Franck Lavaud 1946 Provisional 
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Dumarsais Estimé 1946–1950 Overthrown 
Paul Eugène Magloire 1950–1956 Overthrown 
Joseph Nemours Pierre-Louis 1956–1957 Provisional 
Franck Sylvain 1957 Provisional 
Executive Government 
Council 1957 Provisional 
Antonio Thrasybule Kebreau 1957 Chair, Military Council 
François Duvalier 1957–1971 Died in Office 
Jean-Claude Duvalier 1971–1986 Overthrown 
Henri Namphy 1986–1987 Provisional 
Lesli Manigat 1988 Overthrown 
Henri Namphy 1988–1989 Overthrown 
Prosper Avril 1989–1990 Overthrown 
Etha Pascal-Trouillot 1990–1991 Provisional 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide 1991 Overthrown 
Joseph Nerette 1991–1992 Provisional 
Marc Bazin 1992–1993 Interim 
Émile Jonassaint 1994 Interim 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide 1994–1996 Finished Remainder of Term 
René Préval 1996–2000 Served Full Term 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide 2000–2004 Overthrown 
Boniface Alexandre 2004–2006 Provisional 
René Préval 2006–2011 Served Full Term 
Michel Martelly 2011-present Term Ends in February 2016 
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